wiseTHE RULES
This rulebook is
hard to get right.
We need opinions. Vote, point out a loophole, or rewrite a rule.
You don’t need an account.
No one should be able to search a plate, vehicle, person, or location simply out of curiosity. Every targeted search must be connected to a real case, incident, missing-person investigation, active threat, or another clearly defined public-safety purpose.
Link to this ruleNo proposals in the latest results. Have a better version?
Typing a reason into a box is not meaningful authorization. Searches that expose where someone has traveled over time should require a separate approval step, with stronger authorization as the search becomes more intrusive.
Link to this ruleNo proposals in the latest results. Have a better version?
A vehicle simply passing a camera should not create a permanent movement record. The default should be deletion, with longer preservation allowed only when specific data becomes relevant to an authorized investigation.
Link to this ruleNo proposals in the latest results. Have a better version?
Retention limits are meaningless if agencies can simply save everything before it expires. Preservation should apply only to records connected to a defined investigation, legal obligation, or authorized public-safety need.
Link to this ruleNo proposals in the latest results. Have a better version?
Employees should not be able to casually add a vehicle to continuous monitoring. Hotlist entries should have a defined reason, identifiable source, and expiration or revalidation process.
Link to this ruleNo proposals in the latest results. Have a better version?
Plates can be misread, stolen, cloned, or driven by someone other than the registered owner. A camera alert should be treated as investigative information that requires appropriate verification before action is taken.
Link to this ruleNo proposals in the latest results. Have a better version?
Seeing that a vehicle appeared at one relevant location is different from reconstructing someone’s movements across hours, days, or weeks. The more a query reveals about a person’s habits, destinations, or associations, the stronger the required authorization should become.
Link to this ruleNo proposals in the latest results. Have a better version?
A user should not be able to bypass tracking restrictions by making dozens of smaller searches one at a time. The system should consider the cumulative effect of searches, not just each query in isolation.
Link to this ruleNo proposals in the latest results. Have a better version?
Camera data should not be used to generate lists of people based only on their presence at protests, religious institutions, clinics, political events, neighborhoods, or other lawful activities without a specific authorized investigative basis.
Link to this ruleNo proposals in the latest results. Have a better version?
A system adopted to locate stolen vehicles, missing people, or serious-crime suspects should not quietly become a universal ticketing system. Automated traffic enforcement should be separately debated and governed.
Link to this ruleNo proposals in the latest results. Have a better version?
A local public-safety camera network should not become an indirect location database for civil immigration enforcement. This restriction should apply to both direct searches and requests made through another agency.
Link to this ruleNo proposals in the latest results. Have a better version?
An agency should not be able to bypass its own restrictions by sending data to another organization with looser policies. Restrictions should follow the data wherever it is shared.
Link to this ruleNo proposals in the latest results. Have a better version?
Information collected for public safety should not become behavioral data for advertisers, data brokers, insurers, employers, lenders, or other commercial actors.
Link to this ruleNo proposals in the latest results. Have a better version?
The record should show who performed the action, when it happened, what authority was used, and what data was accessed. Users should not be able to erase or alter their own activity history.
Link to this ruleNo proposals in the latest results. Have a better version?
Real emergencies may require immediate access before normal approvals can occur. Emergency access should exist for those cases, but the user must identify the emergency, receive only the access needed, and face mandatory after-the-fact review.
Link to this ruleNo proposals in the latest results. Have a better version?
The public should be able to see whether a supposedly narrow public-safety tool remains narrow over time. Transparency should reveal meaningful usage patterns without exposing victims or compromising legitimate active investigations.
Link to this ruleNo proposals in the latest results. Have a better version?
Community proposals 0
The next idea could be yours.
Suggest a change to a line above, or draft a new rule.
Make a proposal.
Write a replacement, explain a deletion, or add a new draft. Keep personal details out of public text.
Gather 5 supporters.
Support a specific proposal. The threshold brings it to review—not into force.
Keep decisions visible.
The project editor decides changes. Anonymous votes are signals, not a count of unique people.